Prof. Tayfun Sönmez: "Minimalist Market Design for Organ Transplantation: How to Succeed at Influencing Policy and Changing Institutions"

Kidney exchange was a pioneering application in early market design. Unlike most successful applications — where design economists primarily serve as consultants — kidney exchange researchers acted as outsider critics, reshaping real-world practices and institutions. Drawing on these experiences and lessons from school choice reforms in the 2000s, Sönmez (2023) introduces “minimalist market design” as a novel institutional paradigm. This framework has already delivered tangible results, including the 2021 reform of the US Army’s cadet branching system and the establishment of reserve systems for vaccine and therapy allocation during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
In this lecture, Prof. Sönmez will draw on two decades of experience developing kidney and liver exchange clearinghouses in the United States and Turkey to demonstrate how this “minimally invasive” institution design framework has been pivotal in enhancing market design research’s impact on policy.

Tayfun Sönmez is Professor of Economics at Boston College. He is a world-leading microeconomist renowned for his contributions to game theory, market design, and mechanism design. He has produced major breakthroughs in the field of matching theory, particularly in the development of algorithms for matching markets such as college admissions and organ transplants. Prof. Sönmez is also celebrated for his work on the theory of stable matching and its practical applications in real-world markets. His research has influenced both theoretical and applied economics, earning him a prominent position in the academic community and contributing to a deeper understanding of how individuals and institutions interact within structured markets. Please find more information about Prof. Tayfun Sönmez on his website.

Minimalist market design—a holistic framework for research and policymaking—introduces solutions to failures in economic, political, and social institutions. These solutions may involve mechanisms, governing rules, or even less structured ad hoc systems, surgically removing design flaws while adhering as closely as possible to current policy goals and existing setups. In this mini-course, we will explore the foundations, features, and evolution of this institutional design framework, comparing and contrasting it with other institutional design approaches and  relating it to broader debates on innovation policy. We will also present successful applications of the framework in areas such as school choice, living-donor organ exchange,  affirmative action, and the branching process in the US Army.